The issues about antitrust laws are getting much attention nowadays. And many countries over the world adopt leniency policies to control the actions of cartels. We used a game-theoretical model to discuss the equilibrium of cartels under different antitrust laws. And we modify the model of Blum et al. (2008) to analyze the equilibriums of firms under the different mechanisms of leniency policies. We find out that the value of fine will affect the existence of a cartel, and the recognitions of legitimacies for cartels are important as well. When the antitrust authorities ask firms to propose appliances in advance to let the cartels be legal, firms would incline not to become a cartel. It's quite different from the other mechanism which firms can confess to the antitrust authorities after they've already become a cartel.
Introduction
Much Leniency policy is a new policy that has been applied in recent years.
In this paper, we used a game-theoretical model to analyze the equilibrium belonging to cartel. It isn't always bad for social welfare when there are cartels in society. Sometimes, cartels may be good for the whole society.
Hence, the antitrust authorities have to find their own solutions to raise the whole social welfare. In this paper, we would discuss about the impact of different antitrust laws on firms. For example, the antitrust authorities ask firms hand in their appliance beforehand to be legal. Or after-the-fact policy which means cartels can be legal as they are good for the whole society even they don't tell the antitrust authorities first. Blum et al. 
The model
We based on the model of Blum et al. (2008) As for the antitrust authorities, they must want the leniency policy to be useful and be attractive for any party to defect. So, leniency privilege must be known for every player. Moreover, antitrust authorities would prefer to take side of the whole society to maximize social welfare.
Let's begin to introduce the meaning of parameters: We assume the market reward is  , the cartel surplus is c , the fine for a proven cartel is f , and the leniency reduction is w . The first mover has an additional advantage, a , it can be regard as an improved cost structure or getting an increased market share. If leniency privilege is not only for the first mover but also granted to the subsequent confessing parties, the authority may offer the confessors a reward, z , instead of w . As we can see, z applies to the second confessor in the model, and [0, ] zw  . And note that z is non-negative because it would reduce the fine, f . And p is the probability of a confession being processed by the antitrust authority which might be less than 1 because of work overloaded.
(0,1) p  .
And the normal form of the game is presented in Table 1 . 
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If the equilibrium is (1'), it means there is a stable cartel. If the equilibrium is (2') or (3'), it means one part of them defects and be the crown witness. If the equilibrium is (4'), which means that they both defect and there would be a price war and cartel fine.
In Table 1 , the definitions of the symbols are as below:
We didn't only care about the equilibrium payoff of two firms, but also put emphasis on the consumers' surplus.
That's because we take the stance of the social welfare. And we will discuss it in the later section.
Stable equilibriums of firms
In this section, we're going to introduce the equilibrium, and Bayesian
Nash equilibrium is used to analyze the model. Meanwhile, to avoid the complexity to blur the discussion, we based on the results of pure strategy.
And the conditions of equilibrium are listed in Table 2 . Let's talk about another situation under different condition. And Figure 2 is the situation when ac  and a c z    . Because of a c z    , the horizontal axis value of e is zero. There are also tow lines, 1 L and 2 L , to distinguish the equilibrium areas. And e is ( , 0) z . Under a c z    , there is no equilibrium area for (2') and (3').
That is to say, there is no circumstance for two firms that one firm complies with the cartel agreement and the other one defects. Here we show the Figure 2 as below:
And what we want to focus on is the two firms' stable equilibrium. When f is large, it's easier to exist the equilibrium of being a cartel because of firms don't want to take any risk of being punished；On the contrary, when f is small enough, the equilibrium of both two firms' defecting strategies would happen more likely. The Bayesian Nash equilibriums may be summarized as the first two propositions in the following.
(1') is an unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium for two firms to be a cartel.
there are two equilibrium (1') and (4') in this area. When the two (1') and (4') are the equilibriums at the same time, we call that coordinate game. Generally speaking, it depends on the value of 1 A and 1 D to know which one is easier to be the equilibrium.
DA  , (4') would be the equilibrium more easily. On the contrary, it's more likely to exist the equilibrium (1').
【Proposition 3】 When a c z    , it won't exist the equilibrium of (2') and (3').
If firms are aware of their own benefit is too small for them to confess to the authority, they have no incentive to defect. Hence, there are no equilibrium of (2') and (3'). And it is shown in Figure 2 .
Besides, the legitimacies of cartels in Taiwan and in America (as well as European countries) are different. In Taiwan, if firms don't apply to the authorities, the actions of collusion 
conclusion
In this paper, we used a game-theoretical model to analyze the equilibriums of two firms' strategies in a cartel. And the amount of fine payment is the key factor to affect two firms' equilibrium.
The actions of firms being a cartel would be allowed if it is good for the whole society. That is to say, the antitrust authorities will not interfere too much to forbid cartels all the time.
However in Taiwan, antitrust authorities will not permit a cartel absolutely if firms do not make applications in advance. The conclusion is that cartels are easier to appear in America (or Europe) than in Taiwan. Hence, how to enact the antitrust laws becomes a very important issue to the cartel office. This paper is surely to provide a point of view for antitrust authorities to set the policies of leniency programs.
And it may intrigue more people to study about this issue in the future and then the antitrust authorities would control the actions of cartels more effectively.
